The Distinct Effects of Information Technology and Communication Technology on Firm Organization

被引:309
作者
Bloom, Nicholas [1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ]
Garicano, Luis [1 ,3 ,5 ]
Sadun, Raffaella [1 ,2 ,3 ,6 ]
Van Reenen, John [1 ,2 ,3 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Ctr Econ Performance, London WC2A 2AE, England
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London EC1V 3PZ, England
[4] Stanford Univ, Dept Econ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
[5] London Sch Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England
[6] Harvard Univ, Harvard Business Sch, Boston, MA 02163 USA
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
organization; delegation; information technology; communication technology; the theory of the firm; PERFORMANCE PAY; AUTHORITY; PRODUCTIVITY; DECENTRALIZATION; COORDINATION; HIERARCHIES; DELEGATION; KNOWLEDGE; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.2014.2013
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Guided by theories of "management by exception," we study the impact of information and communication technology on worker and plant manager autonomy and span of control. The theory suggests that information technology is a decentralizing force, whereas communication technology is a centralizing force. Using a new data set of American and European manufacturing firms, we find indeed that better information technologies (enterprise resource planning (ERP) for plant managers and computer-assisted design/computer-assisted manufacturing for production workers) are associated with more autonomy and a wider span of control, whereas technologies that improve communication (like data intranets) decrease autonomy for workers and plant managers. Using instrumental variables (distance from ERP's place of origin and heterogeneous telecommunication costs arising from regulation) strengthens our results. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2013.
引用
收藏
页码:2859 / 2885
页数:27
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