THE ORGANIZATION OF DECENTRALIZED INFORMATION-PROCESSING

被引:289
作者
RADNER, R [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU,DEPT ECON,NEW YORK,NY 10003
关键词
DECENTRALIZATION; ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRM; INFORMATION-PROCESSING;
D O I
10.2307/2951495
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
In a decision-theoretic model of a firm, I represent managers as information processors of limited capacity; efficiency is measured in terms of the number of processors and the delay between the receipt of information by the organization and the implementation of the decision. I characterize efficient networks for both one-shot and repeated regimes, as well as the corresponding ''production function'' relating the number of items processed to the number of processors and the delay. I sketch some applications to common decision paradigms, and implications for decentralization and organizational returns to scale.
引用
收藏
页码:1109 / 1146
页数:38
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