Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments

被引:204
作者
Gueth, Werner
Levati, M. Vittoria
Sutter, Matthias
Van der Heijden, Eline
机构
[1] Univ Innsbruck, Dept Econ, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria
[2] Max Planck Inst Econ, Strateg Interact Grp, D-07745 Jena, Germany
[3] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
[4] CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
关键词
voluntary contribution experiment; leadership; exclusion power; endogenous selection;
D O I
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.007
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contribution experiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group member contribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadership increases contributions in comparison to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism, especially so when it goes along with authority in the form of granting the leader exclusion power. Whether leadership is fixed or rotating among group members has no significant influence on contributions. Only a minority of groups succeeds in endogenously installing a leader, even though groups with leaders are much more efficient than groups without a leader. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1023 / 1042
页数:20
相关论文
共 35 条
[1]   The carrot or the stick: Rewards, punishments, and cooperation [J].
Andreoni, J ;
Harbaugh, W ;
Vesterlund, L .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2003, 93 (03) :893-902
[2]  
[Anonymous], 5497 CEPR
[3]   Leadership and the aggregation of international collective action [J].
Arce, DG .
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 2001, 53 (01) :114-137
[4]   ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition [J].
Bolton, GE ;
Ockenfels, A .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2000, 90 (01) :166-193
[5]   Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach [J].
Brandts, J ;
Schram, A .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2001, 79 (02) :399-427
[6]   Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment [J].
Cinyabuguma, M ;
Page, T ;
Putterman, L .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2005, 89 (08) :1421-1435
[7]   A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation [J].
Fehr, E ;
Schmidt, KM .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1999, 114 (03) :817-868
[8]   Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments [J].
Fehr, E ;
Gächter, S .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2000, 90 (04) :980-994
[9]   Are people conditionally cooperative?: Evidence from a public goods experiment [J].
Fischbacher, U ;
Gächter, S ;
Fehr, E .
ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2001, 71 (03) :397-404
[10]  
FISCHBACHER U, 1999, 21 U ZUR