What factors determine bargaining power and success in EU negotiations?

被引:41
作者
Bailer, Stefanie [1 ]
机构
[1] ETH, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland
关键词
Bargaining power; bargaining success; Council of Ministers; European Union; negotiations; partisan preferences; reciprocity; EUROPEAN-UNION; DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS; COUNCIL PRESIDENCY; ACTOR ALIGNMENTS; DECISION-MAKING; VOTING POWER; POLITICS; POSITIONS; PREFERENCES; DIMENSIONS;
D O I
10.1080/13501761003748765
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Negotiations in the European Union (EU) Council of Ministers are highly secretive, so outsiders have limited knowledge of the factors that determine bargaining power there. However, previous research has shown that gains and losses in these negotiations are relatively equally shared amongst the EU members and that the influence of exogenous power resources such as votes are more important than endogenous resources such as bargaining skill (Bailer 2004). Based on findings of the current literature on bargaining success in EU negotiations, I suggest several areas for future research - in particular regarding the partisan preferences of EU governments and the way this influences their coalition formation behaviour. More attention should also be paid to the context of these negotiations, their differing meeting frequencies and the resulting reciprocity logics. However, more efforts to generate and analyse data on negotiation positions will be necessary in order to see what bargaining power can achieve in the Council.
引用
收藏
页码:743 / 757
页数:15
相关论文
共 87 条
[11]   Multiple embeddedness and socialization in Europe: The case of council officials [J].
Beyers, J .
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 2005, 59 (04) :899-936
[12]   Nationality and European negotiations: The working groups of the Council of Ministers [J].
Beyers, J ;
Dierickx, G .
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1997, 3 (04) :435-471
[13]  
Doring Holger., 2010, PARLIAMENT GOVT COMP
[14]  
Dür A, 2010, JCMS-J COMMON MARK S, V48, P557
[15]  
Egeberg M., 2003, 4 CES
[16]  
Elgström O, 2000, J EUR PUBLIC POLICY, V7, P684
[17]  
Elgstrom Ole., 2005, EUROPEAN UNION NEGOT
[18]  
FOUILLEUX E, 2001, ECSA ANN C MAD WI 31
[19]   Even more reasons to resist the temptation of power indices in the EU [J].
Garrett, G ;
Tsebelis, G .
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS, 2001, 13 (01) :99-105
[20]   Why resist the temptation to apply power indices to the European Union? [J].
Garrett, G ;
Tsebelis, G .
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS, 1999, 11 (03) :291-308