Transparency and firm innovation

被引:226
作者
Thong, Rong [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Illinois, Dept Accounting, Chicago, IL 60607 USA
关键词
R&D; Career concern; Management tumover; Implicit contracting; Proprietary cost; Corporate governance; RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT; INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CEO TURNOVER; INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP; INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY; INFORMATION ASYMMETRY; FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; DISCLOSURE POLICY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.02.001
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Firm innovation drives both firm competitiveness and economic growth. Constructing a novel firm-patent panel database from 29 countries, I find that transparency directly boosts innovative effort by reducing managerial career concerns. This effect operates through transparency's implicit contracting role: it reduces the sensitivity of management turnover to poor innovative output. Transparency also increases innovative efficiency through its governance role in facilitating efficient allocation of R&D capital. Nonetheless, the benefit of transparency is fully offset in environments with greater proprietary cost. These findings illuminate the unique roles and mechanisms of transparency in promoting innovation incentives and outcomes.
引用
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页码:67 / 93
页数:27
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