To lead or not to lead Endogenous sequencing in public goods games

被引：38

作者：

Haigner, Stefan D. ^{[1
]}

Wakolbinger, Florian ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Innsbruck, Dept Publ Econ, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria

[2] Univ Linz, Dept Econ, A-4040 Linz, Austria

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2010年 / 108卷 / 01期

关键词：

Public goods; Leadership; Endogenous; Sequencing; Experiment; EXAMPLE;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.025

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We compare the influence of endogenous leadership on group's contributions in a public goods game with an exogenously appointed leader and find that groups with voluntary leaders outperform groups with involuntary leaders. The decision to contribute last does not undermine cooperation. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：93 / 95

页数：3

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