CEO decision horizon and firm performance: An empirical investigation

被引：181

作者：

Antia, Murad ^{[1
]}

Pantzalis, Christos ^{[1
]}

Park, Jung Chul ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ S Florida, Coll Business Adm, Dept Finance, Tampa, FL 33620 USA

[2] Louisiana Tech Univ, Dept Econ & Finance, Coll Business, Ruston, LA 71272 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE | 2010年 / 16卷 / 03期

关键词：

CEO decision horizon; Firm performance; Information risk; Agency costs; FREE CASH FLOW; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; CAREER CONCERNS; EARNINGS; COMPENSATION; INFORMATION; AGENCY; COSTS; MANAGEMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.01.005

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We investigate the effect of top managers' myopia on firms' market valuation. We devise a measure of expected CEO tenure as a proxy for the length of CEO decision horizon. After accounting for the endogenous nature of CEO horizon, our empirical tests show that shorter CEO horizon is associated with more agency costs, lower firm valuation and higher levels of information risk. The results are consistent with the notion that a short CEO decision horizon is indicative of preference for investments that offer relatively faster paybacks at the expense of long-term value creation. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：288 / 301

页数：14

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