The State of Corporate Governance Research

被引:251
作者
Bebchuk, Lucian A. [1 ,2 ]
Weisbach, Michael S. [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Sch Law, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Ohio State Univ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
关键词
BOARD COMPOSITION; INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; INVESTOR PROTECTION; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; UNITED-STATES; OWNERSHIP; LAW; COMPENSATION; INSTITUTIONS;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhp121
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This article, which introduces the special issue on corporate governance cosponsored by the Review of Financial Studies and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), reviews and comments on the state of corporate governance research. The special issue features seven articles on corporate governance that were presented in a meeting of the NBER's corporate governance project. Each of the articles represents state-of-the-art research in an important area of corporate governance research. For each of these areas, we discuss the importance of the area and the questions it focuses on, how the article in the special issue makes a significant contribution to this area, and what we do and do not know about the area. We discuss in turn work on shareholders and shareholder activism, directors, executives and their compensation, controlling shareholders, comparative corporate governance, cross-border investments in global capital markets, and the political economy of corporate governance. (JEL G34)
引用
收藏
页码:939 / 961
页数:23
相关论文
共 128 条
[61]   Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: the role of institutional investors [J].
Gillan, SL ;
Starks, LT .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2000, 57 (02) :275-305
[62]   The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States [J].
Gillan, Stuart L. ;
Starks, Laura T. .
JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, 2007, 19 (01) :55-+
[63]   Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidence [J].
Gillette, AB ;
Noe, TH ;
Rebello, MJ .
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2003, 58 (05) :1997-2031
[64]   Legal origins [J].
Glaeser, EL ;
Shleifer, A .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2002, 117 (04) :1193-1229
[65]   Corporate governance and equity prices [J].
Gompers, P ;
Ishii, J ;
Metrick, A .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2003, 118 (01) :107-155
[66]   Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States [J].
Gompers, Paul A. ;
Ishii, Joy ;
Metrick, Andrew .
REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, 2010, 23 (03) :1051-1088
[67]  
Gordon JN, 2007, STANFORD LAW REV, V59, P1465
[68]   Investor activism and takeovers [J].
Greenwood, Robin ;
Schor, Michael .
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2009, 92 (03) :362-375
[69]   TAKEOVER BIDS, THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM, AND THE THEORY OF THE CORPORATION [J].
GROSSMAN, SJ ;
HART, OD .
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 11 (01) :42-64
[70]   International differences in the cost of equity capital: Do legal institutions and securities regulation matter? [J].
Hail, L ;
Leuz, C .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 2006, 44 (03) :485-531