An experimental test of design alternative for the British 3G/UMTS auction

被引：13

作者：

Abbink, K

Irlenbusch, B

Pezanis-Christou, P

Rockenbach, B

Sadrieh, A

Selten, R

机构：

[1] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

[2] Tilburg Univ, CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

[3] Univ Nottingham, Sch Econ, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England

[4] Univ Erfurt, Lehrstuhl Mikrookon, D-99089 Erfurt, Germany

[5] CSIC, Inst Anal Econ, Bellaterra 08193, Barcelona, Spain

[6] Univ Bonn, Lab Expt Wirtschaftsforsch, D-53113 Bonn, Germany

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2005年 / 49卷 / 02期

关键词：

spectrum auctions; incumbents; new entrants; UMTS; experiments;

D O I：

10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00044-8

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In spring 2000, the British government auctioned off licences for Third Generation mobile telecommunications services. In the preparation of the auction. two designs involving each a hybrid of an English and a sealed-bid auction were considered by the government: A discriminatory and a uniform price variant. We report an experiment on these two designs. and also compare the results to those with a pure English auction. Both hybrids are similar in efficiency. revenue differences disappear as bidders get experienced. Compared to the discriminatory format, the pure English auction induces more entry. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：505 / 530

页数：26

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