EFFICIENT PROVISION OF A DISCRETE PUBLIC GOOD

被引:18
作者
GRADSTEIN, M
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2527002
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A discrete public good is characterized by a threshold production function: the good is provided if a certain number of contributors is reached. I consider a Bayesian framework where an individual's cost associated with his participation in the provision of a public good is private information. An efficient allocation mechanism is constructed when the outside option-available to individuals refusing to participate in the mechanism-is zero utility, and also for uniform uncertainty when the outside option is either voluntary contribution or forced contribution.
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页码:877 / 897
页数:21
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