TRIPARTITE INCOME EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AND COALITION INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY

被引：4

作者：

BROWN, M ^{[1
]}

WOLFSTETTER, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] FREE UNIV BERLIN, D-1000 BERLIN 33, FED REP GER

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1989年 / 20卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555572

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：291 / 307

页数：17

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