SANCTIONS

被引:102
作者
EATON, J
ENGERS, M
机构
[1] NATL BUR ECON RES,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02138
[2] UNIV VIRGINIA,CHARLOTTESVILLE,VA 22903
[3] OSAKA UNIV,INST SOCIAL & ECON RES,OSAKA,JAPAN
关键词
D O I
10.1086/261845
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Sanctions are measures that one party (the sender) uses to influence another (the target). Sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, have been used by governments to alter the human rights, trade, or foreign policies of other governments. We develop notions of the sender's and target's toughness that depend on their patience and on the extent of their suffering from sanctions. How much a sender can exact from the target depends on the relative toughness of the two. Sanctions that impose less harm on the target can sometimes be more effective than those that impose greater harm.
引用
收藏
页码:899 / 928
页数:30
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