THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP WITH AN INFORMED PRINCIPAL - THE CASE OF PRIVATE VALUES

被引：184

作者：

MASKIN, E ^{[1
]}

TIROLE, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] MIT,DEPT ECON,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1990年 / 58卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2938208

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：379 / 409

页数：31

共 22 条

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