COOPERATION AND PUNISHMENT UNDER REPEATED MAJORITY VOTING

被引：26

作者：

EPPLE, D ^{[1
]}

RIORDAN, MH ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

PUBLIC CHOICE | 1987年 / 55卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF00156810

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：41 / 73

页数：33

共 21 条

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CREMER, J .

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EPPLE, D ;

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