MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH A PRODUCTION EXTERNALITY

被引：11

作者：

CHOI, YK

机构：

[1] School of Management, J051, University of Texas at Dallas, P.O. Box 830688, Richardson

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1993年 / 42卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(93)90170-H

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A multi-agent model is extended to examine the optimal incentive contract when a production externality is significant in team production. A situation is described where relative performance evaluation is ineffective.

引用

页码：37 / 42

页数：6

共 10 条

[1]

ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777

[2] AN EMPIRICAL-INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF CORPORATE-EXECUTIVES [J].

ANTLE, R ;

SMITH, A .

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 1986, 24 (01) :1-39

[3]

GIBBONS R, 1990, IND LABOR RELATIONS, V43, P30

[4] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS [J].

HOLMSTROM, B .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02) :324-340

[5] AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVES [J].

HOLMSTROM, B ;

MILGROM, P .

ECONOMETRICA, 1987, 55 (02) :303-328

[6]

HOLMSTROM B, 1990, J INST THEOR ECON, V146, P85

[7]

ITOH H, 1992, J LAW ECON ORGAN, V8, P321

[8]

MAHER M, 1987, ACCOUNTING MANAGEMEN, P295

[9]

RAMAKRISHNAN RTS, 1991, J LAW ECON ORGAN, V7, P248

[10] MULTI-AGENT CONTROL IN PERFECTLY CORRELATED ENVIRONMENTS [J].

SAPPINGTON, D ;

DEMSKI, JS .

ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1983, 13 (04) :325-330

← 1 →