MULTI-AGENT CONTROL IN PERFECTLY CORRELATED ENVIRONMENTS

被引：14

作者：

SAPPINGTON, D ^{[1
]}

DEMSKI, JS ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(83)90189-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：325 / 330

页数：6

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[6]

NALEBUFF B, 1982, 293 PRINC U EC RES P

[7]

NALEBUFF BJ, 1983, AM ECON REV, V73, P278

[8] LIMITED-LIABILITY CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND AGENT [J].

SAPPINGTON, D .

[9]

SAPPINGTON D, 1983, OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CO