ABILITY, MORAL HAZARD, FIRM SIZE, AND DIVERSIFICATION

被引：62

作者：

ARON, DJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,CHICAGO,IL 60611

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1988年 / 19卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555398

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：72 / 87

页数：16

相关论文

共 18 条

[1] ARON D, 1985, THESIS U CHICAGO
[2] OPTIMAL INCENTIVE SCHEMES - EXISTENCE AND CHARACTERIZATION
CLARKE, FH
DARROUGH, MN
[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1980, 5 (04) : 305 - 310
[3] DIAMOND DW, 1982, J FINANC, V37, P221
[4] Gort M., 1962, DIVERSIFICATION INTE
[5] A COMPARISON OF TOURNAMENTS AND CONTRACTS
GREEN, JR
STOKEY, NL
[J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1983, 91 (03) : 349 - 364
[6] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM
GROSSMAN, SJ
HART, OD
[J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) : 7 - 45
[7] MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS
HOLMSTROM, B
[J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1982, 13 (02): : 324 - 340
[8] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY
HOLMSTROM, B
[J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91
[9] A NOTE ON CONGLOMERATE MERGER AND BEHAVIORAL-RESPONSE TO RISK
IRELAND, NJ
[J]. JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 1983, 31 (03) : 283 - 289
[10] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS
LAZEAR, EP
ROSEN, S
[J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (05) : 841 - 864