2-PERSON BARGAINING PROBLEMS WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：91

作者：

MYERSON, RB

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1911499

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：461 / 487

页数：27

共 13 条

[1]

AUMANN RJ, 1967, MODELS GRADUAL REDUC, P289

HARSANYI, JC .

[3]

Harsanyi J., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[4]

Harsanyi J. C., 1967, MANAGE SCI, V14, P159, DOI [10.1287/mnsc.14.3.159, DOI 10.1287/MNSC.14.3.159]

[5]

HARSANYI JC, 1972, MANAGE SCI B-APPL, V18, pP80

[6] EFFICIENT AND DURABLE DECISION RULES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].

HOLMSTROM, B ;

MYERSON, RB .

[7]

MYERSON R, 1976, THESIS HARVARD U

[8] INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND THE BARGAINING PROBLEM [J].

MYERSON, RB .

[9] MECHANISM DESIGN BY AN INFORMED PRINCIPAL [J].

MYERSON, RB .

MYERSON, RB .