WORKER REPUTATION AND PRODUCTIVITY INCENTIVES

被引：10

作者：

ARON, DJ

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF LABOR ECONOMICS | 1987年 / 5卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1086/298166

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：S87 / S106

页数：20

共 17 条

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[4]

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[8]

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[9]

LAFFONT JJ, 1985, USING COST OBSERVATI

[10]

LAZEAR EP, 1984, SALARIES PIECE RATES

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