THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATIONAL INCENTIVES

被引：295

作者：

LAMBERT, RA ^{[1
]}

LARCKER, DF ^{[1
]}

WEIGELT, K ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV PENN,UNIV MUSEUM,PHILADELPHIA,PA 19104

来源：

ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY | 1993年 / 38卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2393375

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

To improve understanding and design of organizational incentives, we used confidential compensation data obtained for four distinct organizational levels (ranging from plant manager to corporate chief executive officer) to evaluate the ability of tournament, managerial power, and agency theories to explain these observed compensation data. Our results suggest that organizational incentives are most appropriately characterized by a combination of these models, rather than being completely described by a single theoretical description.

引用

页码：438 / 461

页数：24

共 48 条

[1] DOES PERFORMANCE-BASED MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION AFFECT CORPORATE PERFORMANCE [J].