DECENTRALIZED CHOICE OF MONITORING SYSTEMS

[11] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) : 33 - 64

[12] HARRIS M, 1982, REV EC STUDIES, P315

[13] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[14] HOLTHAUSEN RW, 1981, J ACCOUNTING EC MAR, P73

[15] SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (04) : 863 - 894

[16] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279

[17] LAMBERT R, 1981, THESIS STANFORD U

[18] LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION - AN EQUILIBRIUM-ANALYSIS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (02) : 443 - 459

[19] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 280 - 312

[20] MYERSON R, 1979, ECONOMETRICA JAN, P61

[11] RESOURCE-ALLOCATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (01) : 33 - 64

[12] HARRIS M, 1982, REV EC STUDIES, P315

[13] MORAL HAZARD AND OBSERVABILITY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 10 (01): : 74 - 91

[14] HOLTHAUSEN RW, 1981, J ACCOUNTING EC MAR, P73

[15] SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (04) : 863 - 894

[16] REPUTATION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 253 - 279

[17] LAMBERT R, 1981, THESIS STANFORD U

[18] LIMIT PRICING AND ENTRY UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION - AN EQUILIBRIUM-ANALYSIS [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (02) : 443 - 459

[19] PREDATION, REPUTATION, AND ENTRY DETERRENCE [J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1982, 27 (02) : 280 - 312

[20] MYERSON R, 1979, ECONOMETRICA JAN, P61