EXPECTED REVENUE OF ALL-PAY AND FIRST-PRICE SEALED-BID AUCTIONS WITH AFFILIATED SIGNALS

被引：7

作者：

AMANN, E

LEININGER, W

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Dortmund University, Dortmund, D-44221

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE | 1995年 / 61卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/BF01258621

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In the general symmetric auction framework of Milgrom and Weber (1982) it is shown - as a new manifestation of the linkage principle - that the all-pay sealed-bid auction yields higher expected revenue than the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. This raises the question why sealed-bid auctions of the standard first-price variety are observed in practice whereas the all-pay variety is not.

引用

页码：273 / 279

页数：7

共 14 条

[1]

AMANN E, 1994, IN PRESS GAMES EC BE

[2] PUBLIC POLICIES, PRESSURE GROUPS, AND DEAD WEIGHT COSTS [J].