BARGAINING IN LEGISLATURES

被引：914

作者：

BARON, DP

FEREJOHN, JA

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,HOOVER INST,STANFORD,CA 94305

[2] STANFORD UNIV,POLIT SCI,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW | 1989年 / 83卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1961664

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1181 / 1206

页数：26

共 27 条

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