CHEAP TALK CAN MATTER IN BARGAINING

被引:142
作者
FARRELL, J [1 ]
GIBBONS, R [1 ]
机构
[1] MIT,DEPT ECON,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(89)90125-7
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:221 / 237
页数:17
相关论文
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