BILATERAL TRADE WITH THE SEALED BID K-DOUBLE AUCTION - EXISTENCE AND EFFICIENCY

被引：117

作者：

SATTERTHWAITE, MA ^{[1
]}

WILLIAMS, SR ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,DEPT ECON,EVANSTON,IL 60608

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1989年 / 48卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(89)90121-X

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：107 / 133

页数：27

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