THE ROLE OF COMPETITION FOR AN X-INEFFICIENTLY ORGANIZED FIRM

被引：1

作者：

KAMECKE, U

机构：

[1] Universität Bonn, Wirtschaftpolitische Abteilung, 53 Bonn 1

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1993年 / 11卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0167-7187(93)90016-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper presents a manager controlled firm which does not minimize long-run costs even though the manager is the residual claimant maximizing a profit depending salary. The inefficiency results because the employment contracts are not binding in the long run. The manager is afraid of being replaced by a rival. Therefore he invests too much to strengthen his bargaining position in the contract renegotiation. The inefficiency is reduced by competition in the output market.

引用

页码：391 / 405

页数：15