OPTIMAL COALITION SIZE WHEN MAKING PROPOSALS IS COSTLY

被引:8
作者
GLAZER, A [1 ]
MCMILLAN, H [1 ]
机构
[1] US SECUR & EXCHANGE COMMISS,OFF EC ANAL,WASHINGTON,DC 20549
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF01376284
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Though some costs of proposing legislation are borne by individual congressmen, the benefits accrue to many. To encourage legislators to incur these costs, members may wish to form coalitions which are larger than a minimum majority, and they may want to allow the proposer of a policy to incorporate private benefits into his proposal. © 1990 Springer-Verlag.
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页码:369 / 380
页数:12
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