ON GOVERNING MULTILATERAL TRANSACTIONS WITH BILATERAL CONTRACTS

被引：79

作者：

CREMER, J ^{[1
]}

RIORDAN, MH ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1987年 / 18卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555608

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：436 / 451

页数：16

相关论文

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