KEEPING SOCIETY IN THE DARK - ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PRETRIAL NEGOTIATIONS AS EVIDENCE IN COURT

被引:24
作者
DAUGHETY, AF
REINGANUM, JF
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2555913
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We model the settlement and litigation process, allowing for incomplete information about the level of damages on the part of both the defendant and the court, and use the model to examine the effect of making (currently inadmissible) settlement demands admissible as evidence in court should a case proceed to trial. Two conclusions emerge. First, admissibility rules have efficiency consequences: making a pretrial demand admissible would increase the expected number of cases that go to trial. Second, such rules have distributional consequences and need not benefit all parties to a controversy.
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页码:203 / 221
页数:19
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