AN INCOME-STATION MODEL OF EFFICIENCY WAGES

被引：5

作者：

RASMUSEN, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] YALE UNIV, NEW HAVEN, CT 06520 USA

来源：

ECONOMIC INQUIRY | 1992年 / 30卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01975.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Efficiency wages are wages that exceed a worker's reservation wage. A standard explanation for such wages is "bonding": high wages increase the cost of being discharged for misbehavior and so help ensure worker honesty. A neglected alternative is "satiation": by decreasing the worker's marginal utility of income, the high wage decreases the benefit from misbehavior. Satiation, unlike bonding, applies even in a one-period model, but it relies on the misbehavior having a monetary benefit and on at least part of the punishment being nonmonetary.

引用

页码：467 / 478

页数：12

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