WORK INCENTIVES, HIERARCHY, AND INTERNAL LABOR-MARKETS

[1] ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777

[2] HIERARCHY, ABILITY, AND INCOME-DISTRIBUTION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (05) : 991 - 1010

[3] FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN-CAPITAL AND PROMOTION LADDERS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (01): : 251 - 258

[4] Doeringer Peter B, 1971, INTERNAL LABOUR MARK

[5] A COMPARISON OF TOURNAMENTS AND CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1983, 91 (03) : 349 - 364

[6] GREENWALD B, 1979, ADVERSE SELECTION LA

[7] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) : 7 - 45

[8] A THEORY OF WAGE DYNAMICS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1982, 49 (03) : 315 - 333

[9] HOLMSTROM B, 1981, 414 NW U KELL GRAD S

[10] WHY IS THERE MANDATORY RETIREMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (06) : 1261 - 1284

[1] ALCHIAN AA, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P777

[2] HIERARCHY, ABILITY, AND INCOME-DISTRIBUTION [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (05) : 991 - 1010

[3] FIRM-SPECIFIC HUMAN-CAPITAL AND PROMOTION LADDERS [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (01): : 251 - 258

[4] Doeringer Peter B, 1971, INTERNAL LABOUR MARK

[5] A COMPARISON OF TOURNAMENTS AND CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1983, 91 (03) : 349 - 364

[6] GREENWALD B, 1979, ADVERSE SELECTION LA

[7] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) : 7 - 45

[8] A THEORY OF WAGE DYNAMICS [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1982, 49 (03) : 315 - 333

[9] HOLMSTROM B, 1981, 414 NW U KELL GRAD S

[10] WHY IS THERE MANDATORY RETIREMENT [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1979, 87 (06) : 1261 - 1284