WORK INCENTIVES, HIERARCHY, AND INTERNAL LABOR-MARKETS

[11] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (05) : 841 - 864

[12] LAZEAR EP, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P606

[13] Lydall Harold, 1968, STRUCTURE EARNINGS

[14] MALCOMSON JM, 1983, EC J S, V93, P51

[15] EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 95 (04) : 703 - 736

[16] Mincer J.A., 1974, SCH EXPERIENCE EARNI, VNBER

[17] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148

[18] THE COMPENSATION OF EXECUTIVES [J]. SOCIOMETRY, 1957, 20 (01): : 32 - 35

[19] INCENTIVES, RISK, AND INFORMATION - NOTES TOWARDS A THEORY OF HIERARCHY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1975, 6 (02): : 552 - 579

[20] UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT RELATION - ANALYSIS OF IDIOSYNCRATIC EXCHANGE [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1975, 6 (01): : 250 - 278

[11] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (05) : 841 - 864

[12] LAZEAR EP, 1981, AM ECON REV, V71, P606

[13] Lydall Harold, 1968, STRUCTURE EARNINGS

[14] MALCOMSON JM, 1983, EC J S, V93, P51

[15] EXPERIENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND EARNINGS [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1980, 95 (04) : 703 - 736

[16] Mincer J.A., 1974, SCH EXPERIENCE EARNI, VNBER

[17] MONITORING COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN A REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1981, 49 (05) : 1127 - 1148

[18] THE COMPENSATION OF EXECUTIVES [J]. SOCIOMETRY, 1957, 20 (01): : 32 - 35

[19] INCENTIVES, RISK, AND INFORMATION - NOTES TOWARDS A THEORY OF HIERARCHY [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1975, 6 (02): : 552 - 579

[20] UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT RELATION - ANALYSIS OF IDIOSYNCRATIC EXCHANGE [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1975, 6 (01): : 250 - 278