HOW LOW IS A GUARANTEED-LOWEST-PRICE

被引：34

作者：

CHEN, ZQ

机构：

来源：

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE | 1995年 / 28卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/136057

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

A game based on the Bertrand duopoly model is constructed to study the effects of price guarantee policies. Before it chooses a list price, a firm can make a binding commitment to match or beat its competitor's price, The effectiveness of these price guarantee policies in facilitating price collusion depends on the solution concept used. Furthermore, there exists an equilibrium in which neither firm offers any price guarantees and each firm sets price equal to marginal cost.

引用

页码：683 / 701

页数：19

共 10 条

[1]

BELTON TM, 1986, MODEL DUOPOLY M BEAT

[2]

COOPER RW, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P218

[3] MOST-FAVORED-CUSTOMER PRICING AND TACIT COLLUSION [J].