CREDIBLE NEGOTIATION STATEMENTS AND COHERENT PLANS

被引：37

作者：

MYERSON, RB

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(89)90127-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：264 / 303

页数：40

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