OPTIMAL DECENTRALIZED FLOW-CONTROL OF MARKOVIAN QUEUING-NETWORKS WITH MULTIPLE CONTROLLERS

被引:38
作者
HSIAO, MTT
LAZAR, AA
机构
[1] PURDUE UNIV,SCH ELECT ENGN,W LAFAYETTE,IN 47907
[2] COLUMBIA UNIV,DEPT ELECT ENGN,NEW YORK,NY 10027
[3] COLUMBIA UNIV,CTR TELECOMMUN RES,NEW YORK,NY 10027
[4] COLUMBIA UNIV,TELECOMMUN NETWORKS LAB,NEW YORK,NY 10027
关键词
TEAM DECISION; GAME THEORY; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; BCMP NETWORKS; OPTIMAL FLOW CONTROL;
D O I
10.1016/0166-5316(91)90054-7
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
A Markovian queueing network model is used to derive decentralized flow control mechanisms in computer communication networks with multiple controllers. Under the network optimization criterion, finding the optimal decentralized flow control that maximizes the average network throughput under an average network delay bound becomes a team decision problem. It is shown that the network optimization problem depends on the parameters of the network only through the conditional estimates of the total arrival and departure rates. Using linear programming, the network optimal control is demonstrated to be a set of window-type mechanisms. Under the user optimization criterion, each individual user maximizes its average throughput subject to a constraint on its average time delay. Finding the optimal decentralized flow control under the individual user's performance results in a multiple objective optimization problem and leads to a game theoretic formulation. Structural results which simplify the problem are presented. It is shown that the user optimization problem depends on the parameters of the network and the action of the other users only through the conditional estimate of the user service rate. The Nash equilibrium solution under the game theoretic formulation is demonstrated to be a set of window-type mechanisms. Finally, the class of decentralized flow control problems with Nash equilibrium solutions is characterized.
引用
收藏
页码:181 / 204
页数:24
相关论文
共 33 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 1957, GAMES DECIS
[2]  
Basar T, 1982, DYNAMIC NONCOOPERATI
[3]   OPEN, CLOSED, AND MIXED NETWORKS OF QUEUES WITH DIFFERENT CLASSES OF CUSTOMERS [J].
BASKETT, F ;
CHANDY, KM ;
MUNTZ, RR ;
PALACIOS, FG .
JOURNAL OF THE ACM, 1975, 22 (02) :248-260
[4]   A GAME-THEORETIC VIEW OF 2 PROCESSES USING A SINGLE RESOURCE [J].
COURCOUBETIS, C ;
VARAIYA, P .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, 1983, 28 (11) :1059-1061
[5]  
COURCOUBETIS C, 1982, THESIS U CALIFORNIA
[6]   LEADER-FOLLOWER STRATEGIES FOR MULTILEVEL SYSTEMS [J].
CRUZ, JB .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, 1978, 23 (02) :244-255
[7]   SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].
FUDENBERG, D ;
TIROLE, J .
REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1983, 50 (02) :221-247
[8]   A SIMPLIFIED BARGAINING MODEL FOR THE NORMAL-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAME [J].
HARSANYI, JC .
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1963, 4 (02) :194-220
[9]   TEAMS, SIGNALING, AND INFORMATION-THEORY [J].
HO, YC ;
KASTNER, MP ;
WONG, E .
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL, 1978, 23 (02) :305-312
[10]  
HO YC, 1980, IEEE P, V68, P644