MULTI-PERIOD INSURANCE CONTRACTS

被引：60

作者：

COOPER, R

HAYES, B

机构：

[1] UNIV IOWA,IOWA CITY,IA 52242

[2] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,EVANSTON,IL 60201

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1987年 / 5卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/S0167-7187(87)80020-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：211 / 231

页数：21

共 23 条

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