A BARGAINING MODEL WHERE PARTIES MAKE ERRORS

被引：27

作者：

CARLSSON, H

机构：

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1991年 / 59卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2938376

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1487 / 1496

页数：10

共 11 条

[1]

Binmore K., 1987, EC BARGAINING

[2]

Carlsson H., 1989, GLOBAL GAMES RISK DO

[3] A BILATERAL MONOPOLY AND THE NASH COOPERATIVE SOLUTION [J].

KANEKO, M .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1981, 24 (03) :311-327

[4] ON THE STRATEGIC STABILITY OF EQUILIBRIA [J].

KOHLBERG, E ;

MERTENS, JF .

ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (05) :1003-1037

[5] EQUILIBRIA OF THE SEALED-BID MECHANISM FOR BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].

LEININGER, W ;

LINHART, PB ;

RADNER, R .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1989, 48 (01) :63-106

[6] PRE-PLAY COMMUNICATION IN 2-PERSON SEALED-BID DOUBLE AUCTIONS [J].

MATTHEWS, SA ;

POSTLEWAITE, A .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1989, 48 (01) :238-263

[7] GOOD-NEWS AND BAD NEWS - REPRESENTATION THEOREMS AND APPLICATIONS [J].

MILGROM, PR .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1981, 12 (02) :380-391

[8] TWO-PERSON COOPERATIVE GAMES [J].

Nash, John .

ECONOMETRICA, 1953, 21 (01) :128-140

[9]

Roth, 1979, AXIOMATIC MODELS BAR

[10] PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM IN A BARGAINING MODEL [J].

RUBINSTEIN, A .

ECONOMETRICA, 1982, 50 (01) :97-109

← 1 2 →