EXTRACTING THE SURPLUS IN THE COMMON-VALUE AUCTION

被引：42

作者：

MCAFEE, RP ^{[1
]}

MCMILLAN, J ^{[1
]}

RENY, PJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF SAN DIEGO,GRAD SCH INT RELAT & PACIFIC STUDIES,LA JOLLA,CA 92093

来源：

ECONOMETRICA | 1989年 / 57卷 / 06期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1913717

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1451 / 1459

页数：9

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