REPUTATION AND TIME CONSISTENCY

被引：1

作者：

STOKEY, NL

机构：

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1989年 / 79卷 / 02期

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D O I：

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中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

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页码：134 / 139

页数：6

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