EX ANTE EFFICIENT, EX POST INDIVIDUALLY RATIONAL TRADE

被引：12

作者：

GRESIK, TA

机构：

[1] John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University, St. Louis

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1991年 / 53卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0022-0531(91)90145-T

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Consider a bilateral-trade model with two-sided incomplete information. For a general set of independent beliefs, an ex post individually rational mechanism generating the same level of ex ante expected gains from trade as an ex ante efficient, interim individually rational mechanism is constructed. Thus, imposing the stronger notion of ex post individual rationality on this mechanism design problem generates no loss of efficiency. © 1991.

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页码：131 / 145

页数：15

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