RANK-ORDER CONTRACTS FOR A PRINCIPAL WITH MANY AGENTS

被引：57

作者：

MALCOMSON, JM

机构：

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1986年 / 53卷 / 05期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297720

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：807 / 817

页数：11

共 18 条

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