AGENCY BUDGETS, COST INFORMATION, AND AUDITING

被引：63

作者：

BANKS, JS

机构：

来源：

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE | 1989年 / 33卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2111068

中图分类号：

D0 [政治学、政治理论];

学科分类号：

0302 ; 030201 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：670 / 699

页数：30

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