The Impact of Family Involvement on SMEs' Performance: Theory and Evidence

被引：106

作者：

De Massis, Alfredo ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Kotlar, Josip ^{[4
]}

Campopiano, Giovanna ^{[3
]}

Cassia, Lucio ^{[5
,6
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Lancaster, Sch Management, Ctr Family Business, Lancaster LA1 4QL, England

[2] Univ Lancaster, Sch Management, IEED, Family Business & Innovat, Lancaster LA1 4QL, England

[3] Univ Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy

[4] Univ Lancaster, Sch Management, IEED, Lancaster LA1 4QL, England

[5] Univ Bergamo, Strateg Management, Bergamo, Italy

[6] CYFE, Bergamo, Italy

来源：

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT | 2015年 / 53卷 / 04期

关键词：

TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS; FIRM PERFORMANCE; AGENCY COSTS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; DECISION-MAKING; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; OWNERSHIP DISPERSION; CONCEPTUAL ISSUES; BOARD COMPOSITION; UPPER ECHELONS;

D O I：

10.1111/jsbm.12093

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

By complementing agency theory with behavioral assumptions, we explore the effects of family involvement on small and medium enterprises' (SMEs) performance. We identify three separate dimensions of family involvement and hypothesize nonlinear, direct, and interaction effects on the performance of an SME. The evidence on 787 SMEs suggests that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between family ownership and performance, and ownership dispersion among family members negatively affects performance. Balancing family and nonfamily members in the top management team (TMT) is found to be beneficial to SMEs' performance, but the family ratio in the TMT becomes crucial only at high levels of family ownership.

引用

页码：924 / 948

页数：25

共 132 条

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