Eliciting informative feedback: The peer-prediction method

被引:255
作者
Miller, N [1 ]
Resnick, P
Zeckhauser, R
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Univ Michigan, Sch Informat, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA
关键词
proper scoring rules; electronic markets; honest feedback;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1050.0379
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
Many recommendation and decision processes depend on eliciting evaluations of opportunities, products, and vendors. A scoring system is devised that induces honest reporting of feedback. Each rater merely reports a signal, and the system applies proper scoring rules to the implied posterior beliefs about another rater's report. Honest reporting proves to be a Nash equilibrium. The scoring schemes can be scaled to induce appropriate effort by raters and can be extended to handle sequential interaction and continuous signals. We also address a number of practical implementation issues that arise in settings such as academic reviewing and online recommender and reputation systems.
引用
收藏
页码:1359 / 1373
页数:15
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