Are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play in signaling games

被引:256
作者
Cooper, DJ
Kagel, JH
机构
[1] Case Western Reserve Univ, Weatherhead Sch Management, Dept Econ, Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
[2] Ohio State Univ, Dept Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1257/0002828054201431
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding "truth-wins" norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following changes in payoffs that change the equilibrium outcome. Individuals play less strategically following the change in payoffs than inexperienced subjects playing the same game. In contrast, the teams exhibit positive learning transfer, playing more strategically following the change than inexperienced subjects. Dialogues between teammates are used to identify factors promoting strategic play.
引用
收藏
页码:477 / 509
页数:33
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