Who falls for fake news? The roles of bullshit receptivity, overclaiming, familiarity, and analytic thinking

被引:401
作者
Pennycook, Gordon [1 ]
Rand, David G. [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Regina, Hill Levene Sch Business, 3737 Wascana Pky, Regina, SK S4S 0A2, Canada
[2] MIT, Sloan Sch, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
[3] MIT, Dept Brain & Cognit Sci, E25-618, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
关键词
analytic thinking; bullshit receptivity; fake news; news media; social media; COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST; INDIVIDUAL-DIFFERENCES; SCIENCE LITERACY; FLUENCY; PREDICTOR; PEOPLE; BELIEF; TRUTH; FORM;
D O I
10.1111/jopy.12476
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Objective Fake news represents a particularly egregious and direct avenue by which inaccurate beliefs have been propagated via social media. We investigate the psychological profile of individuals who fall prey to fake news. Method We recruited 1,606 participants from Amazon's Mechanical Turk for three online surveys. Results The tendency to ascribe profundity to randomly generated sentences-pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity-correlates positively with perceptions of fake news accuracy, and negatively with the ability to differentiate between fake and real news (media truth discernment). Relatedly, individuals who overclaim their level of knowledge also judge fake news to be more accurate. We also extend previous research indicating that analytic thinking correlates negatively with perceived accuracy by showing that this relationship is not moderated by the presence/absence of the headline's source (which has no effect on accuracy), or by familiarity with the headlines (which correlates positively with perceived accuracy of fake and real news). Conclusion Our results suggest that belief in fake news may be driven, to some extent, by a general tendency to be overly accepting of weak claims. This tendency, which we refer to as reflexive open-mindedness, may be partly responsible for the prevalence of epistemically suspect beliefs writ large.
引用
收藏
页码:185 / 200
页数:16
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