Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria

被引：18

作者：

Mailath, GJ ^{[1
]}

Postlewaite, A

Samuelson, L

机构：

[1] Univ Penn, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

[2] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 USA

来源：

GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2005年 / 53卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

epsilon equilibrium; ex ante payoff; multistage game; subgame perfect equilibrium;

D O I：

10.1016/j.geb.2005.05.002

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We examine contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria, in which a player's actions after every history, evaluated at the point of deviation from the equilibrium, must be within epsilon of a best response. This concept implies, but is stronger than, Radner's ex ante perfect epsilon-equilibrium. A strategy profile is a contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibrium of a game if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium in a perturbed game with nearly the same payoffs, with the converse holding for pure equilibria. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：126 / 140

页数：15

共 13 条

[1] PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM HISTORIES OF FINITE AND INFINITE HORIZON GAMES [J].