Scoring Rules and Competitive Behavior in Best-Value Construction Auctions

被引：29

作者：

Ballesteros-Perez, Pablo ^{[1
]}

Skitmore, Martin ^{[2
]}

Pellicer, Eugenio ^{[3
]}

Zhang, Xiaoling ^{[4
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Reading, Sch Construct Management & Engn, Reading RG6 6AW, Berks, England

[2] Queensland Univ Technol, Sch Civil Engn & Built Environm, Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia

[3] Univ Politecn Valencia, Sch Civil Engn, Camino Vera S-N, E-46022 Valencia, Spain

[4] City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Publ Policy, Tat Chee Ave, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

来源：

JOURNAL OF CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT | 2016年 / 142卷 / 09期

关键词：

Construction auctions; Scoring rule; Capped auctions; Economic bid weighting; Abnormally low bids criterion; Bid scoring formula; Competitive bidding; Contracting; CONTRACTOR SELECTION; PROCUREMENT; UTILITY; PRICE; CRITERIA; BIDS; CORRUPTION; TENDERS; CHOICE; SYSTEM;

D O I：

10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001144

中图分类号：

TU [建筑科学];

学科分类号：

0813 ;

摘要：

This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in best value or multiattribute construction auctions, in which both the (dollar) bid and technical nonprice criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score weighting, bid scoring formula, and abnormally low bids criterion are variables likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of bids. Revealing the influence of the bid scoring rules and their magnitude on bidders' competitive behavior opens the door for the engineer to condition bidder competitive behavior in such a way as to provide the balance needed to achieve the owner's desired strategic outcomes.

引用

页数：14

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