Common agency with horizontally differentiated principals

被引:26
作者
Mezzetti, C
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/2555808
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
I analyze a common agency relationship where the agent has private information about the difference in his value for two principals. When the principals independently offer incentive contracts, the agent specializes less than is socially efficient, but more than when they cooperate and choose the contract that maximizes their joint payoff Under both arrangements the agent faces countervailing incentives. The pooling region of types receiving a flat fee is larger and the incentive pay of the remaining types is lower powered under cooperation than tinder independent contracting The principals prefer independent contracting with a common agent to exclusive dealing.
引用
收藏
页码:323 / 345
页数:23
相关论文
共 22 条
[1]  
Arnold VI, 1998, ORDINARY DIFFERENTIA
[2]   COMMON AGENCY [J].
BERNHEIM, BD ;
WHINSTON, MD .
ECONOMETRICA, 1986, 54 (04) :923-942
[3]   COMMON MARKETING AGENCY AS A DEVICE FOR FACILITATING COLLUSION [J].
BERNHEIM, BD ;
WHINSTON, MD .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1985, 16 (02) :269-281
[4]  
BERNHEIM BD, 1992, UNPUB EXCLUSIVE DEAL
[5]   PRINCIPALS COMPETING FOR AN AGENT IN THE PRESENCE OF ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD [J].
BIGLAISER, G ;
MEZZETTI, C .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1993, 61 (02) :302-330
[6]  
BOND EW, 1993, UNPUB REGULATION MUL
[7]   NEGOTIATED TRADE RESTRICTIONS WITH PRIVATE POLITICAL PRESSURE [J].
FEENSTRA, RC ;
LEWIS, TR .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1991, 106 (04) :1287-1307
[8]   COMMON AGENCY - EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM IN THE CASE OF 2 OUTCOMES [J].
FRAYSSE, J .
ECONOMETRICA, 1993, 61 (05) :1225-1229
[9]   A COMMON AGENCY WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION [J].
GALOR, E .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1991, 22 (02) :274-286
[10]   AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM [J].
GROSSMAN, SJ ;
HART, OD .
ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) :7-45