Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison

被引:22
作者
Katok, E [1 ]
Sefton, M
Yavas, A
机构
[1] Penn State Univ, Smeal Coll Business Adm, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
[2] Univ Nottingham, Sch Econ, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
关键词
D O I
10.1006/jeth.2001.2832
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 [经济学];
摘要
We report experimental results on the relative performance of simultaneous and sequential versions of the Abreu-Matsushima mechanism. Under the simultaneous version, subjects typically use undominated strategies, but apply only a limited number of iterations of dominance. Consequently the unique strategy surviving iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies is rarely observed. Under the sequential version, subjects also typically use undominated strategies, but apply only a limited number of steps of backward induction. Thus the backward induction outcome is also rarely observed. The sequential version results in fewer observed outcomes corresponding to the predicted outcome than the simultaneous version. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).
引用
收藏
页码:89 / 103
页数:15
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